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Abstract. The original hypothesis is that forests will be a 
policy subsector in which the challenges of climate change 
adaptation lead to broader policy mandates but that the 
declining role of the industry in the Canadian economy will 
cause departmental resources to be stable or decreasing. The 
result will be ineffective policy capacity, leading to adapta-
tion policies that are poorly designed, incomplete or missing 
altogether. This paper provides some evidence to support 
this hypothesis, though the situation is complicated by the 
dominant role played by the provinces in both ownership 
and jurisdiction. While the leading federal department, 
Natural Resources Canada, has shed other mandates to focus 
on climate change, provincial agencies are already caught 
between the added costs of addressing climate change im-
pacts, notably wildfire, and the need to plan for and imple-
ment long term adaptive policies with stable or declining 
resources. Much will depend on coordination between First 
Nations, the provinces and the federal government in a 
policy subsector with a history of conflict between the differ-
ent orders of government. 
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Résumé. L’hypothèse originale est que les forêts seront un 
sous-secteur de politiques publiques dans lequel les défis de 
l’adaptation au changement climatique conduit à des man-
dats politiques plus larges, mais que le rôle en déclin de 
l’industrie dans l’économie canadienne occasionnera une 
stabilité ou une baisse de ressources du ministère. Cela 
produira une capacité de politiques publiques inefficace, 
conduisant à des politiques d’adaptation mal conçues, in-
complètes ou totalement inexistantes. Cet article apporte des 
éléments pour soutenir cette hypothèse, bien que la situation 
soit compliquée du fait du rôle dominant des provinces, à la 
fois concernant leur responsabilité et leur compétence. Alors 
que le ministère fédéral, Ressources Naturelles Canada, s’est 
défait d’autres mandats pour se concentrer sur le change-
ment climatique, les agences provinciales sont prises entre 
les coûts additionnels pour faire face aux conséquences du 
changement climatique, en particulier les feux de forêt, et le 
besoin de mettre sur pieds des politiques flexibles sur le long 
terme en tenant compte de ressources stables ou en baisse. 
Beaucoup dépendra de la coordination entre Premières 
Nations, les provinces et le gouvernement fédéral, dans un 
sous-secteur de politiques publiques avec une histoire con-
flictuelle entre les différents niveaux de gouvernement. 
 
Mots clefs. Politique forestière; adaptation au changement 
climatique; capacité de politiques publiques; gouvernance; 





Climate change is expected to pose significant challenges to 
the Canadian forest sector. The series of warmer winters that 
has created the conditions for the catastrophic outbreak of 
the mountain pine beetle in the western provinces is be-
lieved to be a precursor of warmer, drier conditions over 
much of the continent. As a result, many types of forests will 
suffer significant stress from fire, disease, drought and ex-
treme weather events. Predictions of growth, yield and forest 
extent may need substantial modification. Assessing policy 
capacity to meet these challenges in Canada’s forestry sector 
is complicated by the decentralization that characterises the 
sector. Not only do almost all aspects of forest planning and 
forest management fall squarely within provincial jurisdic-
tion, but provinces have also largely divested themselves of 
operational responsibility for the extensive forests on Crown 
land in favour of on-the-ground management by long-term 
licensees.  
In these circumstances, forest policy in the provinces is 
presented as finding a balance between supporting an indus-
try in an increasingly difficult competitive position in world 
markets and setting a regulatory framework to ensure that 
forest management is conducted sustainably, capturing the 
full range of public and private goods found in forests. While 
climate change is likely to make striking this balance even 
more difficult, it will also test the ability of these decentral-
ized governance arrangements to pursue a consistent long 
term goal such as climate change adaptation in the face of 
the competing ideas and interests of a wide range of actors.  
Policy capacity in such a decentralized subsector is some-
thing more than the sum of federal and provincial capacity; 
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it is also a function of successful coordination or governance. 
For this reason, it is necessary to consider policy capacity at 
both levels while paying particular attention to the sectoral 
governance arrangements. 
 
Background: Forests and Climate Change 
 
The meso-level sectoral case studies in this volume are all 
directed at the larger question of the relationship between 
policy analytical capacity and Canada’s ability to meet the 
challenges of climate change adaptation.  The case studies 
explicitly recognize that the severity of the challenges will 
depend on the nature of the issues, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the governance arrangements and the resources of 
government, more narrowly defined, which will all vary from 
sector to sector. In forestry, the issues raised by climate 
change, though relatively easy to describe, are often quite 
novel and surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. 
In addition, the governance architecture is relatively com-
plex, involving provincial, national, regional and interna-
tional components along the vertical dimension and a variety 
of non-state actors promoting new governance arrangements 
across the horizontal dimension (Howlett and Rayner 2006; 
Howlett, Rayner and Tollefson, 2009; Capano, Rayner and 
Zito, 2012) . Both the crosscutting nature of the issues and 
the complexity of the sectoral governance architecture are 
tending to blur the identity of forest policy, which now exists 
at the intersection of a host of more sharply defined policy 
sectors, and this development is reflected in changes in the 
organizations of government responsible for forest policy 
and, ultimately, in the policy capacity to address the chal-
lenges posed by climate change. 
 
The nature of the issues 
Policy capacity is obviously very much a function of the 
nature of the issue and the characteristics of the surrounding 
policy field (Frey 2010: 673). A relatively simple and tracta-
ble problem about which a great deal is already known is 
likely to require much less capacity in order to provide sound 
advice than more difficult and novel issues over which the 
main policy actors continue to disagree. Traditional forest 
policy was a mix of relatively well structured problems (Si-
mon 1973), such as managing public forest lands to ensure a 
constant flow of wood fibre to the forest industry, and some 
classic “wicked” problems (Rittel and Webber 1973; Nie 
2003)), such as those involved in designing protected area 
and biodiversity conservation policies. Climate change adap-
tation is generally considered to present a very challenging 
set of issues that fall into the latter category. Features such 
as novelty, scientific uncertainty, and the need to bring about 
behavioural change in target populations create difficulties 
on the analytical side, while the cross-sectoral linkages and 
the unequal burdens that climate change adaptation will 
place on different provinces create fairly severe governance 
challenges.  
Specifically, in the forestry case there continue to be un-
certainties about the precise impacts of climate change given 
the wide variability and broad brush scope of climate change 
scenarios over the long time horizons of 50 years or more 
typically involved in forest planning and management. First, 
changes in growing conditions threaten the ongoing efforts 
of forest managers to match tree species and subspecies to 
appropriate sites when replanting after harvest, with conse-
quent loss of productivity. Given that the calculation of 
current allowable cuts are based on estimates of productivity 
far into the future, these changes threaten even the narrow 
definition of “ forest sustainability” as the ability to produce 
a constant or growing volume of timber in perpetuity (Brit-
ish Columbia 2007). Second, the prediction of hotter and 
drier conditions for the southern edge of the boreal forest 
from northern Ontario, through Manitoba, Saskatchewan 
and into northern Alberta (and even BC and Alaska in some 
models), suggests an increase in the frequency, extent and 
severity of forest fires (Wotton, Nock and Flannigan 2010). 
As noted below, provincial forest agencies are already ex-
pending significant extra resources fighting these fires (re-
sources that are not available to increase policy analytical 
capacity). In the end, climate change may force a strategic 
change in the management of wildfire, allowing many more 
of these fires to burn with consequences for forest composi-
tion and extent (McKenzie, Millar and Falk 2011). Similar 
issues exist where the dynamics of forest pest infestations 
are changed by warmer winters or drier summers, as the 
mountain pine beetle outbreak in the interior of BC has 
shown. Again, while these new conditions are predicted in 
many climate change scenarios, their precise timing and 
extent remain highly uncertain.  
Third, the network of protected forest areas that has been 
created to address biodiversity conservation goals (notably 
the efforts to combine the 12% minimum protection promot-
ed after Rio with conservation biologists’ desire for the pro-
tection of “representative ecosystems”) may soon be unable 
to meet these goals. As an Ontario climate change assess-
ment notes: 
Current protected areas may no longer contain the “best” 
representative examples of features, ecosystems and species. 
As species move and ecological boundaries change in re-
sponse to climate change, ecological communities will 
change and some may be lost from within the fixed bounda-
ries of protected areas (Ontario n.d.: 10) 
Given the bitter legacy of the battles to create the existing 
protected areas, adding new ones or even changing the 
boundaries of current protected areas poses a significant 
challenge to forest policy. With conflicting problem defini-
tions and the sense of an endlessly moving target, the pro-
tected area issue has the potential to reopen a classic wicked 
problem that many thought had been largely resolved 
through a series of high profile public engagement processes 
and agreements. 
Fourth, the forest industry and forest dependent com-
munities will be challenged to adapt to these new conditions, 
often by being encouraged to adapt by responding to other 
opportunities provided by the new climate change policy 
agenda. For example, mitigation and adaptation are closely 
linked when the industry is urged to replace existing trees 
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species with fast growing hardwood species that can se-
quester carbon or provide biomass for energy (Park and 
Wilson 2007). The interest in developing “second genera-
tion” biofuels from wood waste is a related development. At 
this point, adaptive policy within the forest policy sector 
becomes inextricably linked to a host of other policy areas, 
including larger climate change mitigation goals, energy 
policy, science and innovation policy and more. 
Advice on how to tackle these problems will generally be 
framed within the dominant policy paradigm of Sustainable 
Forest Management (SFM). The SFM paradigm developed in 
response to criticisms that twentieth century forest man-
agement was narrowly focused on the production of fibre for 
industrial forest products users, neglecting not only the 
many other values potentially available in forests but also 
the entire social dimension of forest use. SFM draws on the 
language of sustainable development to propose the 
achievement of a long term, sustainable balance between 
social, economic and ecological values as the overarching 
goal of forest policy (Burton et al. 2003). While championing 
a more participatory approach to the development of forest 
policy as the best way to achieve this balance, SFM is none-
theless the language of professional forestry and forest eco-
nomics. There is a large and well-recognized expert commu-
nity of scientists and managers working within the SFM 
paradigm who regard Canada as a world leader in the devel-
opment of forest practices that implement SFM principles 
(Rayner and Howlett 2007). There is also a lively debate 
about the extent to which climate change considerations can 
be accommodated within those principles and practice or 
will require some significant modifications to them (Klenk et 
al. 2011).  
Without diminishing the fact that the existence of the 
unified SFM paradigm increases policy analytical capacity 
and promotes evidence-based policy making, these are argu-
ably not the paradigm’s most important consequences. As its 
name implies, SFM is primarily focused on management and 
the gap between management and policy has proved difficult 
to close. Forest scientists typically have little to say about 
policy options, which are often confused with or restricted to 
regulatory changes. Where forest managers and scientists 
recognize the existence and relevance of policy at all, they 
generally describe the kinds of considerations that enter into 
policy analysis as “socio-economic factors” that lie outside 
their own expertise (Spies et al. 2010).  Forest economics 
still dominates the professional framing and assessment of 
policy options (Luckert, Haley and Hoberg 2011). However, 
by promoting a common discourse, the existence of an ex-
pert policy community that transcends jurisdictional bound-
aries (including national boundaries) gives a huge boost to 
coordination efforts in forestry policy. In particular, SFM has 
promoted the development of a number of sophisticated 
information instruments based on criteria and indicators 
that have the potential to improve governance as well as 





Governance arrangements are a critical dimension even in 
the simplest case where a single government agency has a 
unique and all-encompassing mandate to address a policy 
problem. The capacity to successfully address the problem at 
hand will be a combination of the agency’s ability to coordi-
nate its own activities with its ability to coordinate those of 
other key actors, including the target populations of the 
policy (Gleeson et al. 2011). The challenges of this kind of 
coordination will be different at different stages of the policy 
cycle, usually greater at agenda setting, formulation and 
implementation than during decision-making and evaluation 
but always present to some degree. As usual, there is a prob-
lem of the independence of the two dimensions here because 
successful coordination is likely to enhance the analytical 
capacity of the agency by drawing in capacity from other 
actors, while failure is likely to lead to key gaps in infor-
mation and analysis.  
The situation is slightly more complex when policy re-
sponsibilities are divided between multiple departments and 
more complex still when they are divided between multiple 
departments in multiple jurisdictions. While even a single, 
dominant government department may face very significant 
challenges of policy coordination, successful governance 
arrangements that span multiple jurisdictions and divided 
departmental responsibilities are by no means unknown. 
These considerations all bear on the forestry case, where the 
federal government has a very restricted range of governance 
options to coordinate provincial activities, and where climate 
change policy is usually divided between environment minis-
tries (often the lead agency) and the “resource development” 
ministries where responsibility for forest policy and coordi-
nation with the forest industry itself are located.  
In the provinces, the delegation of responsibility for for-
est management planning to licensees who are focused on 
the short term problems of staying in business in highly 
competitive markets is another challenge to the kind of long 
term policy development required to address adaptation to 
climate change (Luckert, Haley and Hoberg, 2011). Much of 
the data gathering and monitoring required for analysis are 
also conducted by these licensees and analytical capacity is 
ultimately a joint problem of government and industry. 
These coordination challenges are not insuperable and once 
again, the presence of a shared discourse and professional 
training is very helpful. Nonetheless, as much of the recent 
history of forest policy illustrates only too well, attending to 
the challenges of coordination often crowds out the need to 
communicate with other stakeholders and the attentive 
public (Howlett et al. 2009; but see the symposium intro-
duced by Robson and Parkins 2010), a common problem in 
“compound” political systems characterized by multi-level 
governance and dispersed authority (Schmidt 2007). Ad-
dressing communication deficits puts a  further strain on 
policy capacity at the provincial level. The strain is likely to 
be increased as adaptation to climate change leads to con-
troversial policy changes initiated within the professional 
forest policy community that need to be communicated to a 
larger audience, for example, new fire management practices 
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that aim to control the build up of fuels in forests that are 
also used for recreation. For all these reasons, the discursive 
construction of the departmental mandates will be an espe-
cially important element in assessing policy capacity. 
 
Federal organizational capacity:  
Natural Resources Canada 
 
Discursive construction of the mandate 
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) was created in 1993 by 
the merger of Forestry Canada and the Department of Ener-
gy, Mines and Resources, providing a relatively stable home 
for federal forestry after several decades of departmental 
reorganizations. Brief periods as a standalone forestry de-
partment from 1960-66 and 1989-1993 punctuated a confus-
ing round of post-war changes in which forests were com-
bined with, successively, mines, resources, northern affairs, 
rural development, fisheries, environment, agriculture, back 
to environment again, and finally full circle to resources. It is 
hard to escape the impression that the federal forestry file is 
an orphan in search of a home. In fact, it could hardly be 
otherwise, given the provinces’ constitutional jurisdiction 
over crown forests. Efforts to assert federal “leadership” in 
this sector have always been resented or rebuffed, even when 
they took the form of shared cost programs (Howlett 2001). 
In recent years the federal mandate has revolved around 
a core group of activities, closely related to both federal 
jurisdictional responsibilities and the legacies of previous 
departmental affiliations (Table 1). First, the export orienta-
tion of the forest industry has been connected to the interna-
tional trade mandate and thence to programs supporting 
industry competitiveness and market access. Second, federal 
responsibility for First Nations and Metis has produced 
several programs to develop and support Aboriginal forestry 
and, by extension, to support forest dependent communities 
generally. The latter is largely a research function, though 
some spending is conducted through the Model Forests 
Program. Third, the existence of international multi-lateral 
negotiations on forestry issues since Rio has created an 
interest in maintaining a Canadian “profile” in these negotia-
tions to protect Canadian interests. Fourth, NRCan inherited 
the research resources of the Canadian Forest Service (CFS) 
and continues to operate them in support of a number of 
programs, including innovation and economic forecasting 
but also climate change adaptation. Finally, NRCan provides 
the secretariat and other support services for the federal-
provincial governance group, the Canadian Council of Forest 
Ministers (CCFM).  
Table 1 suggests that NRCan’s forestry mandate has re-
mained relatively stable over the last five years. The three 
core activities of innovation, competitiveness and communi-
ties attract a shifting cast of related programs but the num-
ber of activities remains broadly similar. Nonetheless, this is 
probably an oversimplified interpretation. In particular, the 
replacement of climate change reporting by the disturbance 
and adaptation theme represents both a broadening of the 
mandate itself and a move from a fairly fixed focus to a po-
tentially more open-ended one. The explicit recognition of 
adaptation in this theme suggests another attempt to coor-
dinate activities that are already taking place in a more dis-
jointed way in the provinces. 
 
 
Table 1: NRCan program activities, 2006-2010. 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Innovation x x x x x 
Science and technol-
ogy governance     x 
Energy-based sus-
tainability in pulp and 
paper 
    x 
Economic market 
value from forests    x  
Competitive Indus-
try/secure markets x x x x x 




  x x x 
International recogni-
tion for Canada x x x x  
Climate change 
reporting x x    
Forest disturbance/ 
adaptation   x x x 
Forest dependent 
communities x x x x x 
 
The major shift in the discursive construction of the fed-
eral forestry mandate can be illustrated by the transfor-
mation of one of the key efforts at federal provincial coordi-
nation, the National Forest Strategy (NFS), formerly the 
National Forest Sector Strategy (Table 2).  Essentially an 
agenda setting and network building exercise, the NFS 
showed a distinct tendency towards mission creep over the 
first 20 years of its existence. The Strategy and its accompa-
nying Accord, signed by an ever larger and more diverse 
group of stakeholders, were characterized by an effort at 
inclusiveness that only encouraged a lengthening list of 
increasingly vague aspirations. The introduction of reporting 
requirements in the later strategies merely allowed signato-
ries to engage in self-congratulatory exercises in cherry-
picked categories without providing much evidence of over-
all progress or failure. Certainly no attempt was made to 
benchmark or to identify leaders and laggards (Rayner and 
Howlett 2007).  
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In 2008 the Strategy was replaced by a CCFM “Vision” 
document that focuses on just two strategic priorities, trans-
forming the forest industry’s competitive position and ad-
dressing climate change mitigation and adaptation. This is 
reflected in the 2010 strategic priorities of NRCan, so that 
the overall impact of the growing salience of the climate 
change issue seems to have been to force the federal gov-
ernment to engage in priority setting. The political difficul-
ties of focusing the vision in this way should not be underes-
timated, as each of the themes from the old NFS represented 
the concerns of a particular set of interests, who fought to 
maintain their place in the Strategy. Whether the new focus 
on climate change adaptation as part of the “vision” will 
actually be translated into programmatic activity and how 
that activity will be divided between the federal and provin-
cial governments remains to be seen.  
 
Changes in the nature of the network 
The changes in the Virtual Policy Network confirm many of 
the inferences from the mandates data. While the earlier 
network is clearly centralized on NRCan, whose centrality 
would be even higher if the CFS links were added, the latest 
VPN shows the rapid internationalization of climate change 
adaptation in forestry. Moreover, the strong showing of 
research organizations, including university departments 
and industry-university innovation centres, in the earlier 
VPN is replaced in the second crawl by social media that are 
typically used by non-governmental organizations or by 
international organizations seeking to mobilize global civil 
society. Finally, while the key role of SFM discourse in or-
ganizing the network and maintaining its boundaries is 
apparent in the first crawl, the proliferation of new actors 
and global civil society, especially international organiza-
tions whose primary focus is not forestry but some other 
forest-related issue, will inevitably introduce new ideas.   
All of the previous observations support the inference 
that the VPNs are networks focused on agenda-setting and 
policy formulation rather than policy implementation. While 
network density is relatively low in both networks, suggest-
ing that new ideas can be introduced into the networks and 
circulated relatively rapidly, the tendency of this openness 
will be to destabilize the SFM consensus rather than pro-
mote policy learning based on experience and reflexivity. 
The kind of learning that will take place here is similar to 
what Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) call framing learning, 
where the participants have very little control over either the 
means and content of learning, so that the learning experi-
ence will operate through issue framing in the context of a 
given over-arching goal. Unfortunately, learning of this kind, 
while it may eventually produce a common understanding of 
the nature of the problem and promote legitimation, will be 
unlikely to increase policy analytical capacity. The latter, it 
may be surmised, requires a much more focused and con-
strained kind of learning than this loose and open network 
can engender. 
In short, the earlier VPN suggested a surprising degree of 
governance capacity, with NRCan as a nodal organization 
and the network configured in such a way as to answer the 
innovation mandate and to promote learning about climate 
change adaptation within the SFM framework. The new 
network, on the other hand, represents loss of steering ca-
pacity by the federal government on this issue (hardly sur-
prising given the present government’s approach to climate 
change) and a tendency to fragmentation involving actors at 
a number of different levels, both state and non-state. As 
Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) have observed, the overall gov-
ernance capacity of a network of this kind will depend very 
much on the capacities of the non-state actors involved and 
the kinds of non-state actors that reach nodal positions 
(Howlett and Rayner 2006; McNutt 2010) 
 
Resources 
According to the theoretical framework used for this study, 
policy capacity is a function of the relationship between 
mandates and resources. In the forestry case, the initial 
hypothesis is that climate change adaptation will expand the 
mandate while government priorities will fail to deliver the 
resources necessary to match the expansion. As with man-
dates, the picture on the resource side at the federal level is 
more complicated. Around half of all NRCan spending in the 
period under review was accounted for by transfer payments 
under the Atlantic Offshore Accord and hence not relevant to 
the forestry mandate. Moreover, the latest representation of 
NRCan’s mandate over the last decade, focusing on the 
relationship between the three “strategic outcomes” and the 
various activities that contribute to achieving them makes it 
increasingly difficult to separate forest-related expenditures 
from those on unrelated activities that contribute to the 
same goal. 
 
Table 3: NRCan Total Expenditure, Forest-Related  
Expenditures and FTEs 
 













2005 - 2006 1680 158.7 4565  
2006 – 2007 1685.7 178.1 4379 974 
2007 – 2008 3341 206.7 (268.3) 4320 892 
2008 - 2009 4677.5 (264.8) 4486  
2009 - 2010 3185.1 (121.9) 4556  
(figures in parentheses are calculated on a different basis from the 
earlier series) 
 
Nonetheless, it is clear from Table 3 that NRCan showed a 
significant increase in spending in the second half of the 
decade. As the Department’s performance report emphasiz-
es, these increases are directed primarily at energy and 
climate change mitigation rather than forests and adapta-
tion, relating primarily to the Biofuels, Clean Energy and the 
ecoEnergy Retrofit Programs. Forest Market Diversification 
appears to be the only direct forest-related new expenditures 
and that objective is a very traditional one relating to the 
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health of the industry. All that can be said with certainty is 
that, for the years for which forest-related expenditures can 
be broken out, they run at between 6 and 12 per cent of total 
departmental spending. There is no evidence that forest-
related expenditures have gone above or below those bounds 
in spite of the increasing salience of the climate change 
agenda and the likely expansion of mandates that will follow 
in its wake. To see where real tension between an expanding 
agenda and pinched resources is being felt, we must examine 




In an extremely decentralized subsystem such as forestry, 
the picture is radically incomplete without a consideration of 
provincial policy capacities. Not only do provinces own and 
control the extensive forests on provincial Crown land in 
Canada, but they regulate forestry activities on both Crown 
and private lands and, in many cases, derive substantial 
direct and indirect revenues from forestry. In addition, in a 
development that mirrors the situation in the United States, 
since the federal government has been reluctant to take 
action on the climate change file, provinces and even munic-
ipalities have moved into climate change policy in the ab-
sence of federal leadership (Rabe 2007). Forest-related 
adaptation is embedded in larger provincial climate change 
strategies of a kind that barely exist at the federal level in 
Canada.  
Considerations of space preclude an analysis of all ten 
provinces, or even of the half-dozen where significant forest-
ry activity takes place, comparing instead two neighbouring 
provinces, British Columbia and Alberta. Both face signifi-
cant problems of climate change mitigation, mainly from the 
emissions of the energy and transportation sectors, raising 
the salience of climate change issues generally. Though no 
longer a dominant presence in the provincial economy, 
forestry is far more important as an economic driver in BC 
than in Alberta, where revenues from forestry are dwarfed by 
those from oil and gas, particularly, of course, from the oil 
sands (Woodbridge Associates 2009). BC has also sought to 
be a national leader in climate change policy, an early 
adopter of a carbon tax and setting ambitious goals for emis-
sions reductions (Smith 2010; Sodero 2011). Alberta has 
taken a more conservative stance, promoting the idea of 
reductions in emission intensities rather than in absolute 
values as the key to protecting the oil sands (Charpentier et 
al. 2009). Both have also publicly endorsed the importance 
of a long-term adaptation strategy, though, to date, only BC 




Modern forest policy in Alberta dates back to the 1980s, 
when Premier Lougheed set in motion a renewed attempt to 
diversify the provincial economy from its increasing reliance 
on the oil and gas sector. In addition to further growth of the 
softwood lumber industry that had developed along the 
eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains, the government 
offered a series of controversial new tenures in the northern 
boreal forest based on the utilization of fast-growing hard-
wood species for pulp and paper production (Pratt and Ur-
quhart 1994). The policy was extremely successful on its own 
terms, creating and, equally important, retaining new jobs 
and increased revenues from the forest industry at a time 
when the industry from coast to coast entered a very difficult 
period.  
However, the next upturn in the world oil market saw the 
take off of oil sands development, both in the mineable area 
around Fort McMurray and in the deeper subsurface pock-
ets. In the latter, the bitumen is recovered by injecting steam 
into the formation and pumping out the liquefied deposit, a 
process known as Steam Assisted Gravity Driven (SAGD) 
recovery. In both cases, the footprint of the oil industry, 
from the cutting of seismic lines and the building of drilling 
platforms through to the network of pipes, storage facilities 
and pumping stations, is a large one. Much of the recovera-
ble oil sands lies  underneath the new forest tenures and, by 
the middle of the last decade, the forest industry began to 
fear the loss of the merchantable timber that had been in-
cluded in its forest management plans (Brownsey and 
Rayner 2009), fears which have proved entirely justified. 
Given the importance and political influence of the ener-
gy industry in the province, the government has been reluc-
tant to take action. It has enforced the penalty provisions in 
provincial legislation where trees on management license 
areas have been damaged by oil and gas activity. It has tried 
to level the playing field between the resources by increasing 
oil royalty payments only to reverse that decision in the face 
of falling oil prices. And the government did at least follow 
through on its commitment to create a provincial Land Use 
Framework. The Framework employs a priority zoning sys-
tem that, in theory, designates areas where forestry will 
continue as the dominant use and areas where energy devel-
opment will take priority. Nonetheless, forestry remains a 
poor relation in a family of resource departments and their 
client industries dominated by energy. 
 
Discursive construction of the mandate 
Unsurprisingly, forest policy and management in Alberta is 
one of the responsibilities of an “integrated” resource minis-
try, Sustainable Resource Development. However, not only 
is forest policy just one element of SRD’s overall mandate, 
but SRD itself exists in complex administrative constellation 
that includes separate departments covering energy and 
mining in addition to the usual Ministry of Environment. As 
a result, the mandate of Sustainable Resource Development 
is a largely defensive one in which it finds itself isolated from 
provincial policy priorities and without the policy levers it 
needs to support the industry and protect provincial forests 
for forestry. Climate change adaptation provides some op-
portunities, notably in support for the industry through the 
development of cellulose as a biofuels feedstock, and some 
challenges, particularly the appearance of the mountain pine 
beetle in Alberta. Nonetheless, it is hard to escape the con-
clusion that forestry issues are essentially a minor footnote 
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to the climate change policy challenges posed by the oil and 
gas industry. SRD is barely a player in provincial climate 
change policy. 
 
Table 4:  Forest policy mandate changes for Alberta Sustaina-
ble Resource Development 
 
Years Forest Protection Forest Management 
2001—2004 Protect Alberta's 






A “balanced” approach that 





Protection from diseases and 
pests 
 
Increase value of forest 
products 
2005-2008 Provide a prepar-
edness framework 
that enables the 
Province to respond 
to wildfires. 
A balanced approach that 
optimizes the benefits Alber-
tans receive from forests and 
forest lands. 
Manage infestations 
Ensure SFM through appro-
priate planning mechanisms 
Support the Forest Industry 
Partner with other jurisdic-
tions to resolve softwood 
lumber dispute 
Ensure Albertans get a fair 
return for the use of public 
forest lands 
2009-2011 Provide a prepar-
edness framework 
that enables the 
Province to respond 
to wildfires 
 
A balanced approach that 
optimizes the benefits Alber-




Ensure SFM through appro-
priate planning mechanisms 
Support the Forest Industry 
to become more innovative 
and support leading practices 
through education 
Consult with First Nations 
Protect biodiversity and 
watersheds 
Ensure Albertans receive 
benefits from the use of 
forest land to produce fibre 
 
As shown in Table 4, SRD’s forestry mandates have gradual-
ly expanded during the period under study. Grouped around 
the two key areas of forest protection and forest manage-
ment, they all have a utilitarian focus. Forest and rural 
communities are to be protected from the hazards posed by 
wildfire, while forests are to be managed to maximize (or, 
later, optimize) the economic benefits that Albertans receive 
from their public forests. The number of strategic objectives 
under the forest management heading gradually increases 
over the decade, adding biodiversity and watershed protec-
tion and consultation with First Nations. Support for the 
industry is generally restricted to promoting (or, in the earli-
er period “unleashing”) innovation. Alberta has also devel-
oped a series of performance measures related to these 
objectives, for example, the level of sustainable timber har-
vest as a measure of the extent to which SRD is delivering on 
the goal of managing Alberta’s forests to optimize economic 
benefits. While the general trend has been expansion, it is 
noteworthy that climate change adaptation has not explicitly 
added to these mandates nor contributed to loss of focus.  
 
The extent of resources available 
Although forestry expenditures have held up quite well in 
nominal terms over the period studied, increasing by 50% 
over the decade, this increase masks two significant trends. 
First, forest-related expenditures are a declining proportion 
of all SRD expenditures. Second, data from the first half of 
the decade suggest that most of the expenditures are wildfire 
related. Given that the expansion in mandates have occurred 
in forest management rather than the forest protection area, 
this suggests serious erosion of policy capacity, with SRD 
being asked to do more with less. If this trend continues 
when climate change adaptation is eventually added to the 
list of management responsibilities, the outlook for success-
ful policy intervention will be poor.  
 
Table 5: Alberta SRD, Forest Related Expenditures 
 
Year  Forest Related Expenditure, 





2002 204.0 176.3 
2003 321.2 297.0 
2004 326.5 204.9 
2005 208.5 199.8 
2006 351.6 269.4 
2007 348.1 238.0 
2008 339.2 266.6 
2009 306.1 233.4 
2010 308.5 200.8 
 
British Columbia 
Forest policy in BC in the period under review has been 
dominated by the Liberal government’s efforts to effect a 
“revitalization” of the strategically important forest sector, 
removing or modifying many of the traditional forest policy 
instruments of the previous decades. Reversing the previous 
government’s focus on shoring up employment in the sector, 
the stress has been on trying to create a more profitable 
forest industry while winding down the extensive participa-
tory land use planning exercises that had been the response 
to the “war in the woods” of the 1990s. Government to gov-
ernment negotiations with First Nations, on the other hand, 
became a priority, and the award of forest tenures or other 
forms of control over public forests is an important bargain-
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ing chip in these negotiations. Whatever the merits of these 
policy changes, the sector has been battered by a series of 
shocks, including a new round of the long-running softwood 
lumber dispute with its major trading partner, the devastat-
ing mountain pine beetle infestation in the southern interior, 
and the global recession and resulting overcapacity in the 
industry around the world. 
In the latter part of the decade, BC became a leading 
province in the development of climate change policy, origi-
nally focused on mitigation (including a controversial carbon 
tax) but later on the development of adaptation policies and, 
belatedly, an adaptation strategy. Climate change concerns 
have played an ever more significant role in forest policy, 
driven in part by the belief that the mountain pine beetle 
infestation and a series of bad fire seasons, if not actually 
caused by climate change, offer a preview of the challenges 
that a warmer climate will pose for the forest sector. The BC 
Bioenergy Strategy, which promotes the use of beetle-killed 
wood and wood waste for renewable energy and creates new 
bioenergy forest tenures, provides an example of the growing 
linkages between mitigation and adaptation policies. 
 
Mandates 
The province was, for many years, an outlier in administra-
tive organization in Canada, with a dedicated Ministry of 
Forests (now the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural 
Resource Operations) instead of an integrated resource 
department. The development of the mandate of the Minis-
try falls into three periods. Prior to the election of 2001, the 
mandate is organized into two programmatic areas, promot-
ing forest sustainability and ensuring that forest and range 
resources “contribute to the economic well being” of British 
Columbians. Within these two categories were a series of 
very ambitious policy goals that were aspirational rather 
than realistic, reflecting the inflated rhetoric of the 1990s 
"war in the woods" (Cashore et al. 2001). In the early years 
of the Liberal government, the Ministry’s mandate became 
more focused, with associated performance measures, but 
the major categories changed from year to year as the gov-
ernment made a series of legislative and policy changes in 
the sector. Finally, around 2006, the categories stabilize 
around sustainable forest and range resources and sustaina-
ble socio-economic benefits from forest and range resources, 
ironically the same basic categories as the pre-2001 man-
date.  
Under these broad goals, however, the Ministry is 
charged with tackling an ever increasing and complex set of 
objectives, involving managing the salvage cut and replant-
ing in the mountain pine beetle affected areas, working with 
First Nations and forest dependent communities as the 
difficult economic and trade situations exact a toll, and, 
eventually, adaptation to climate change. Climate change 
appears for the first time in 2006 under “sustainable forest 
and range resources”, as a commitment to “work with the 
Ministry of Environment to further policy on carbon credits 
and climate change.” In 2007, adaptation makes its first 
appearance as the objective to “adapt forest stewardship 
policy and practices to changing social, economic and envi-
ronmental conditions (climate change, energy sector devel-
opment), “ subsequently becoming a standalone forest adap-
tation policy seeking to “ensure the appropriate standards 
are in place to increase ecosystem resilience and adapt forest 
and range practices for a changing climate.” 
 
Resources 
Like the rest of the BC public administration, the Ministry of 
Forests and Lands was affected by the government austerity 
program initiated in the early years of the Campbell govern-
ment as a result of attempting both to reduce government 
deficits and follow through on a campaign promise to make 
significant cuts in corporate and personal taxation. By 2004, 
the Ministry lost about $100 million from its budget and fell 
below 3000 FTE staff. By 2005, however, the purse strings 
were opened again for the provincial election and the Minis-
try saw its resources growing for the rest of the decade. The 
growth in FTE complement continues to lag behind expendi-
tures, reflecting the general trend to move policy capacity 
outside the public service and rely ever more heavily on 
contracts and consultants.  
 
Table 7: BC Ministry of Forests and Lands, Expenditure and 
FTE staff 
 
Year Expenditure ($ mil-
lions) 
FTE Staff 
2000 512.0  
2001 537.8 4061 
2002 621.2 3470 
2003 564.9 3070 
2004 524.3 2942 
2005 644.5 3245 
2006 743.7 3559 
2007 730.1 3698 
2008 799.9  





The horizontal crosscutting character of climate change and 
the close linkages between policies to address adaptation 
make it increasingly difficult to break out specific policy 
components and examine the relationship between mandate 
and resources. Given the gaps in reporting critical infor-
mation, such as forest-related FTEs in government depart-
ments with multiple resource programs, the conclusions 
presented here must be necessarily tentative. However, the 
evidence from both federal and provincial forest policy sub-
systems does support the original hypothesis in which man-
dates are increasing but resources are stable or decreasing, 
leading to ineffective policy capacity and the adoption of 
short-term expedients when a longer view is required.  
The situation is relatively clear at the federal level but 
complicated in the provinces by the growing proportion of 
expenditures devoted to fire protection, In Alberta, policy 
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capacity is driven by the interaction of stable mandates with 
stable or declining resources, creating the possibility of 
policy failure when Alberta finally catches up with BC and 
starts to expand climate change adaptation mandates. In BC, 
on the other hand, the development of an adaptation strate-
gy is relatively well advanced and significant new resources 
have been made available to the Ministry of Forests, Lands 
and Natural Resource Operations although not necessarily 
for longer term adaptation. Responding to the weak position 
of the forest industry, new hybrid mitigation/adaptation 
programs are in vogue. For example the BioEnergy Strategy, 
which responds to international demand for biomass, and 
the “Wood First” policy that attempts to increase the domes-
tic market for forest products by stressing the climate change 
benefits of building with wood rather than more energy 
intensive materials, are already in place as outputs of the 
adaptation strategy. Here the challenge will be to set priori-
ties and match capacity with demand as the adaptation 
mandate becomes more complex and the low-hanging fruit 
that offers something for everyone is picked. 
The government of Alberta identified the need for a pro-
vincial adaptation strategy in 2008 but has yet to produce 
one, although a "framework" exists (Alberta 2010). BC pub-
lished a provincial adaptation strategy in 2010 that consists 
of four pages of text (British Columbia 2010), asserting that 
the strategy will be built on a strong foundation of 
knowledge, the integration of adaptation into government 
planning and program implementation, and risk assessment. 
Though unusually brief, the report’s lack of specifics, neglect 
of the very many barriers to the implementation of an effec-
tive adaptation policy and “limited appreciation of the wider 
governance context in which both climate change and its 
management will manifest” (Preston et al. 2010) are all 
typical of such documents. The evidence of policy outputs 
such as these suggest that policy analytical capacity is lack-
ing at the highest levels. In the forest policy field, where 
adaptation continues to be tackled at the level of manage-
ment plans rather than by coordinated policy initiatives, the 
existing gap between capacity and demand can only widen as 
the challenges of adaptation become better understood and 
policy in this area is likely to be ineffective or to fail altogeth-
er.  
As emphasized in this chapter, and as the VPNs confirm, 
governance, in the sense of policy coordination and steering 
is in many ways the key to improving policy capacity for 
adaptation in the very decentralized Canadian forest sector. 
The specific challenge here will be how well the sector can 
deal with the continuing policy vacuum at the federal level. 
At present, the lack of a coherent federal climate change 
policy is having two predictable effects: driving agenda set-
ting and policy framing out of Canada into the international 
arena then bringing policy back in at the provincial and 
community level. These developments are given further 
impetus by the tendency towards further decentralization in 
forest policy and governance over the last decade, including 
greater involvement for First Nations and resource depend-
ent communities. The challenge will be to steer this hetero-
geneous and sometimes mutually antagonistic cast of players 
towards achieving adaptation goals. Given that much of the 
environmental movement continues to be suspicious of 
adaptation efforts as diverting attention from mitigation and 
that adaptation measures may risk further erosion of the 
industry’s already precarious competitive position, forest 
governance will be no easy task. Without improvements in 
this area, though, ineffective policy capacity is likely to char-
acterize the forest sector for some time to come. 
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Table 6. BC Ministry of Forests and Lands Mandates 
 
 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Priority and focus Sustainable man-agement 
Measurable im-
provement of re-
source and benefits 
Measurable im-
provement of re-




agement and benefits 
Forest protection Protection from fire and pests 
Protection from fire 
and pests 
Protection from fire 
and pests to meet 
objectives 





tive forest and range 











and enforcement of 
performance stand-
ards 















sources contribute to 
economic wellbeing 
of citizens and 
communities 
Enhance opportuni-




manage resources to 
deliver sustainable 
benefits 
 
Sustainable socio-
economic benefits 
from resources 
 
	  
 
